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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
REHEARING (ON CLAIMS OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL)

v.
Case No. 021027

RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Appellant was convicted of one count of
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony; one
count of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Attempted Murder in the First
Degree, a first degree felony; one count of Aggravated Kidnapping, a
first degree felony; one count of Escape, a second degree felony;
and one count of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by an Incarcerated
Person, a second degree felony, and directly appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court.
appeal.

Trial counsel continued to represent Appellant on

After counsel filed Appellant's opening brief, Appellant

filed a handwritten supplemental brief alleging that ineffective
assistance of counsel occurred at trial.

The Utah Supreme Court

appointed alternate counsel to review the record and represent
Appellant solely on the claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

On January 31, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed

Appellant's convictions and the judgment imposed, including the
sentence of death.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
After Appellant's counsel filed the opening brief in this
case, Appellant filed a handwritten supplemental brief alleging
ineffective assistance at trial.

Counsel appointed to represent

Appellant on the ineffectiveness claim filed a supplemental brief
wherein he argued that review of this claim by the Court was
premature since no evidentiary hearing had been held.
An evidentiary hearing on the claims has not been held,
and the substantive issue of whether ineffective assistance of
counsel occurred at trial has not been briefed for this Court.
On January 31, 1989, this Court issued its decision.

It

concluded that ineffective assistance of counsel did not occur in
three alleged areas:

the testimony of Officer Jorgensen, the

testimony of Dr. Heinbecker, and the testimony of Mr. Fuches. The
Court reasoned that Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced by the testimony
of any of the three individuals.
In so deciding, this Court misapplied the law,
misconstrued the facts, and compounded Mr. Gardner's claims that he
did not receive effective assistance of counsel.

SOMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court prematurely decided this issue since an
evidentiary hearing has not been held and counsel has not briefed
the issue.
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Introduction
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

In Brown v, Prickard, denying

reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court failed
to consider some material point in the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions. . . .
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913),
this Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in
proper cases. When this court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result. . . . If there
are some reasons, however, such as we have
indicated above, or other good reasons, a petition
for a rehearing should be promptly filed and, if
it is meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
The argument section of this brief will establish that
this Petition for Rehearing is properly before the Court.

In its

opinion in State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 1, 12-13
(January 31, 1989) (relevant portions attached as Addendum A ) , this
Court incorrectly and prematurely concluded that ineffective
assistance of counsel did not occur in this case.
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POINT: MR, GARDNER'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WERE DECIDED PREMATURELY BY
THIS COURT,
In reaching its decision that Mr. Gardner was not denied
effective assistance of counsel as the result of trial counsel's
failure to object to the testimony of Officer Jorgensen and his
calling Dr. Heinbecker and Mr. Fuches, a member of the Board of
Pardons, to testify for the defense during the penalty phase, this
Court misconstrues the facts of this case, the presentation of the
argument, and the applicable law.
Mr. Gardner raised these three claims, among others, in a
handwritten motion filed with the Court after counsel filed the
opening brief in this case.

The record does not establish that

Mr. Gardner received a high school diploma and shows that
Mr. Gardner missed large periods of school (R. 2756).

Despite his

lack of formal education or legal training, he was able to submit a
legal document which cited statutes and case law and which informed
this Court as to some of his concerns regarding his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

He requested that counsel assist

him in raising these issues.
Because trial counsel continued to represent Mr. Gardner
on direct appeal and could not therefore adequately represent him on
his ineffective assistance claims, this Court appointed alternate
counsel to review those claims and to submit a brief regarding those
claims, if appropriate.
premature.

Counsel responded that the claims were

In other words, the claims needed to be investigated and

a hearing held to supplement the record as to counsel's reasons for
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eliciting or not objecting to the various testimonies as well as
other factors.
No lawyer has briefed these claims of ineffective
assistance for the Court and no hearing on the issues has ever been
held.

Despite this Court's conscientiousness in reviewing the

record, the impact of a zealous advocate in raising and briefing the
issues cannot be underestimated.

At the root of our criminal

justice system is the notion that criminal defendants have a right
to have counsel present their defense at trial and to raise their
arguments on appeal.

Since a lawyer has not presented this argument

to the Court, it is premature for this Court to discard the argument
by the wave of a hand with the "no prejudice" label.

In so doing,

this Court compounds Mr. Gardner's claims that he did not receive
effective assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, this Court's summary conclusion that no
prejudice attached to Mr. Gardner as the result of the three alleged
deficiencies misconstrues the record in this case.
First, this Court concludes that even if a Miranda or
sixth amendment violation would have prevented Officer Jorgensen
from testifying, "the evidence was still admissible for the purpose
for which it was offered; therefore, no prejudice resulted from the
lack of an objection to this point."

101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12. On

the contrary, because no instruction was given limiting the use of
the testimony for credibility, the testimony was admitted for
substantive purposes.

Defense counsel argued the substance of the

officer's testimony to the jury (R. 2557), seemingly unaware that it
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was not admissible for that purpose.

The prosecutor also argued the

substance of Jorgensen's testimony and pointed out that it had been
corroborated by other evidence (R. 2587).

Absent a limiting

instruction, the jury nevertheless was left with the impression that
they could consider the testimony for substance and not just for
determining Mr. Gardner's credibility.
In addition, in reaching its decision that the failure to
give an instruction limiting the use which could be made of
Mr. Gardnerfs testimony was not manifest error, this Court states
several times that defense counsel did not object to the testimony
or request a limiting instruction.

101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8.

This

reasoning, when read in conjunction with the ineffective assistance
analysis, seems to leave Mr. Gardner in a remedyless middle ground.
According to the Court, there is no error regarding Officer
Jorgensen's testimony because counsel did not make a record, but the
failure to raise the issues does not amount to ineffective
assistance because Mr. Gardner was not prejudiced.

This is simply

not the case.
Furthermore, by not making a motion to suppress and by
seemingly not understanding that the testimony was suppressible but
could be used for credibility purposes if Mr. Gardner were to
testify, defense counsel was unable to adequately prepare his case
and offer adequate advice to Mr. Gardner as to whether to testify.
The testimony of Officer Jorgensen was devastating to the
defense.

Defense counsel called it the single most damaging piece

of evidence (R. 2557).

In this case where defendant maintained that
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he did not intend to shoot Mr, Burdell, his alleged statements to
Officer Jorgensen when considered for substantive purposes, as the
jury surely did, erased any doubt.
The issue of whether Mr. Gardner was prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance in dealing with the Jorgensen issue
is larger than this Court acknowledges and requires that an
evidentiary hearing be held to supplement the record and that the
issue be adequately briefed.

It is prematurely before this Court

and should not be so easily dismissed.
Dr. Heinbecker's testimony was also devastating to the
defense.

He labeled Mr. Gardner as an anti-social personality,

which conjures negative images for the jury.

Such a label is

generally attached to a defendant by the State as an aggravating
circumstance, not offered by defendant as mitigation.

Furthermore,

Dr. Heinbecker gave the jury little hope that Mr. Gardner would
"reform" when he testified "it is a personality development whereby
people act in these criminal fashions and their personality is
formed and remains that way, generally, for the rest of their lives"
(R. 2799).

He further testified that it is "relatively unusual" for

a person who has had a "bad life" to "turn around as an adult"
(R. 2802) and that Ronnie felt very little guilt and was easily able
to overcome any guilt he might feel (R. 2803).

This suggestion of

future dangerousness, lack of remorse, and inability to change is
generally evidence the prosecution attempts to introduce in the
penalty phase.
The record clearly indicates that Dr. Heinbecker had only
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twenty-four hours to prepare (R. 2794, 7812, 7815).

Defense counsel

therefore had little time to review what Dr. Heinbecker was going to
say and ascertain the benefit, if any, of his testimony.

The State

argued Dr. Heinbecker's testimony in closing, in particular, his
anti-social personality label, and his opinion that such behavior
would continue as reasons for imposing the death penalty (R. 2879).
This issue, like that regarding the testimony of Officer Jorgensen,
requires further exploration, an evidentiary hearing, and briefing.
Finally, the testimony of Mr. Fuches raises concerns
similar to that of Dr. Heinbecker.

Mr. Fuches1 testimony had the

impact of informing the jury that a life sentence does not
necessarily mean life, that defendants are released in as little as
twelve years, and that all defendants get a rehearing within eleven
to thirty years (R. 2822-6).

Again, this is the type of evidence

which the prosecution, not the defense, attempts to put on in the
penalty phase; this issue demands further investigation and
analysis.

Imposing the death penalty out of fear that the defendant

will some day be released from prison if life is imposed is arguably
an improper and irrelevant basis; yet, the defense placed that
information and basis squarely before the jury.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that this Court grant a
rehearing on this issue and determine that the issue is prematurely
before it or remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing on issues related to Mr. Gardner's claims of ineffective
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assistance of counsel.
Counsel certifies that this Petition for Rehearing is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

J^>

day of M,fifcJO<k~f

1989.

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
(on claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel)

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
If EDWARD K. BRASS, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 3 >

day ofty;U£j£-\(

/

1989.

EDWARD'K. BRASS
J7
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED by
of

, 1989.

this

day
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XIV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant cites four instances of behavior
he characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct:
(1) referring to defendant as "defendant
Bishop"; (2) laughing during a presentation by
defense counsel in the penalty phase; (3)
stating in the penalty phase that Gardner had
escaped from maximum security; and (4)
reading from a report that was not received
into evidence. The test by which we measure
alleged misconduct was articulated in State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). We
look to see if the actions or remarks of
counsel call to the attention of the jury a
matter it would not be justified in considering
in determining its verdict and, if so, under the
circumstances of the particular case, whether
"the error is substantial and prejudicial such
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant."
In the first instance alleged, the prosecution
called defendant by the wrong name. Even
though the name was that of another defendant of some notoriety,4 it was not prejudicial.
The reference, taken in context, was inadvertent, was immediately corrected, and did not
interrupt the flow of the proceedings or focus
the jury's attention on an improper basis for
the verdict.
Defendant's second allegation is that the
prosecuting attorney laughed during presentation of a portion of defense counsel's argument in the penalty phase. While we cannot
condone such actions, we accept the State's
explanation that the prosecutor was merely
reacting to defendant's counsel, who had
removed exhibits the State had placed before
the jury. The trial judge promptly admonished
the prosecutor and determined that his action
was neither significant nor prejudicial. Where
there is no abuse of discretion, such a decision
by the trial judge will not be reversed on
appeal. See State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60,
513 P.2d at 426. Our review of the record
reveals nothing that would indicate that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying a
mistrial on this point.
Neither of the last claimed instances was
improper. The reference to Gardner's escape
from maximum security was a matter of interpretation. He was being held in "maximum
security" at the time of his escapes, both in
1984 and in 1985, even though he was outside
the confines of the maximum security unit of
the prison when the escapes occurred. This
fact was made clear to the jury; therefore, the
remark did not misrepresent the facts or focus
the jury's attention on an improper basis for
its decision. Likewise, the portion of the
medical report referred to by the prosecution
had been read into the record; therefore, even
though the written report had not been received in evidence, the prosecution was arguing

CODE • CO
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from evidence in the record. We find no basis
on which to reverse the judgment or sentence
based on prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant
makes other claims, but because there is no
record of the facts from which they arise, we
cannot reach them.
XV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant, in supplemental briefing, raises
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, he points out counsel's failure to
object to the testimony of Officer Jorgensen,
Dr. Heinbecker, and Mr. Fuchs.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
698, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct.
3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court set forth a two-part
test to be used in examining claims based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must show, first, specific acts or omissions which fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance and,
second, that a reasonable probability exists
that but for counsel's error, the result would
have been different. State v. Pursifell, 746
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at
2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699). In State v. Speer,
750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988), we adopted
the approach suggested in Strickland that "[i]f
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, ... that course should be followed."
See also Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 275.
Here, we need not determine whether
counsel's claimed shortfalls meet the first
prong of the test. The failure to object to the
testimony of Officer Jorgensen, as discussed in
section VIII, infra, did not prejudice defendant. Even if his counsel had raised the objection and had been successful in showing a
violation of Miranda, the evidence was still
admissible for the purpose for which it was
offered; therefore, no prejudice resulted from
the lack of an objection to this point. Dr.
Heinbecker, a forensic psychiatrist, testified
on defendant's behalf as to possible sources
of defendant's behavior, such as genetics,
environment, and possible brain damage. Mr.
Fuchs was a member of the Board of Pardons
and was called by the defense to testify generally as to the Board's role in reviewing sentences and determining parole dates. Defendant
does not identify any instance where his
counsel failed to object to any questions asked
during cross-examination of either witness.
Our review of the record does not show
conduct of counsel during the testimony of
either witness which was lacking in any aspect
of effective assistance. Having carefully reviewed the transcript and proceedings below and
the briefs on appeal, we are convinced that
there was no prejudice to defendant in these
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regards. Defendant makes other allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, no
record was made on which we can review
them.
XVI. Cumulative Error
Having fully reviewed the extensive record
in this case, we are convinced that defendant's
constitutional rights were cautiously guarded
at all phases of the proceeding and that,
overall, the trial was conducted in the fair and
dignified fashion a capital case deserves. We
reject defendant's assertions that the cumulative effect of the alleged irregularities discussed above denied him a fair trial.
Defendant's convictions and sentences,
including the sentence of death for the first
degree murder conviction, are affirmed.
I CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
1. AH statutes cited are to Utah Code Annotated
(1953).
2. We also note, as we stated in State v. Gallegos,
16 Utah 2d 102, 104-05, 396 P.2d 414, 415-16
(1964), and State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 58, 513
P.2d 422, 424 (1973), that generally an error in a
manslaughter instruction where the jury finds an
intentional killing is not prejudicial. State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d at 472 (Durham, J., concurring).
3. In State v„ Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah
1988), we held that evidence of other violent crimes
which have not resulted in convictions is admissible
as aggravation of the penalty, subject to a finding
by the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt of those other crimes.
4. Preceding this trial, Arthur Gary Bishop was tried
for the murders of several young boys. His trial and
conviction received prominent coverage in the local
media. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah
1988).
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intentional homicide.
In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 489 (Utah
1988), I joined Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion that expressed a similar view in a
somewhat different legal context. Nevertheless,
I expressly refrained from joining that opinion
insofar as it was based on constitutional
grounds. Again, I decline to adopt a constitutional basis for the rule.
The courts historically have had inherent
supervisory power over the order of adducing
evidence in a case. Reliance on that power in
this case is preferable since it is ordinarily
better to avoid a constitutional ruling when
there is another basis for decision. Constitutionalization of the rule requiring bifurcation
could lead to a degree of rigidity in evidentiary
matters that could have untoward consequences. Evidence of prior crimes may be appropriate or necessary in the guilt phaise of the
trial for a variety of reasons. Such evidence
may be admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) to
prove motive, intent, identity, and other
material issues under certain circumstances. See,
e.g., State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172
(Utah 1982). There may even be instances
when a defendant chooses to adduce prior
crime evidence, for example, to establish an
alibi by showing that he was incarcerated at
the time of an alleged crime. In addition, the
Legislature has in a number of instances made
prior crimes elements of other substantive
crimes. Constitutionalization of the rule might
affect the use of prior crimes in unanticipated
ways. The net effect of all this is that exclusion of evidence of prior crimes as aggravating
circumstances on due process grounds could
have far-reaching ramifications that I am not
prepared to confront.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring)

STEWART, Justice: (Concurring)
I concur in the majority opinion. However,
because today's opinion might otherwise be
taken as casting doubt on the position of a
majority of the Court on one important point,
I append these comments. The majority holds
that it is not necessary to reach the issue of
the admissibility of prior crime evidence used
to prove a capital homicide aggravating factor
under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(l)(h)
because the admission of that evidence was at
most harmless error. That ruling is a sufficient
disposition of the issue here.
Nevertheless, it is especially important in a
capital case to make the law as clear as possible so as to avoid unnecessary error in the
future. For that reason, I think it appropriate
to state my concurrence with Justice Zimmerman's opinion in this case which holds that
evidence of other crimes used to prove an
aggravating circumstance under §76-5202(1 )(h) must be proved after a jury has first
found a defendant guilty of the underlying
UTAH

I join in the majority opinion. However, I
write separately to point out that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of Gardner's
prior convictions before the jury had determined whether Gardner was guilty of a knowing
or intentional homicide.1 See State v. James,
99 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 18-19 (Jan. 6, 1989);
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 494-99 (Utah
1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined by
Stewart and Durham, J.J.). The bifurcated
guilt phase procedure that a majority of the
Court* said was required in Bishop and that we
unanimously imposed in James should have
been followed in the present case. See James,
99 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-19; c/1 State v.
Payton, 361 So. 2d 866, 870-74 (La. 1978)
(holding that prior convictions may not be
introduced in the guilt phase of a murder trial
and that they may therefore not serve as elements of the crime of first degree murder but
must be limited to introduction in tthe penalty
phase as aggravating circumstances justifying
imposition of the death penalty).
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